Jun 5

Jun 5 Starliner's Staying Power: Why Boeing's Long-Grounded Spacecraft Remains Essential to NASA's Future

Starliner blasting off on its crew test mission (Image courtesy of NASA)

“Redundancy is expensive but indispensable”

— Jane Jacobs

***Note: this blog post essentially functions as a “part two” to the original post on the Commercial Crew Program that I wrote in celebration of SpaceX’s successful maiden manned launch. For additional information about the history of the Commercial Crew Program as well as SpaceX’s journey, please refer to the post here: Made in America: The Maiden Flight of the Commercial Crew. Thank you!***

On the clear Wednesday morning of June 6, 2024, after years of delays marred by several incidents, Boeing’s Starliner capsule has finally made its maiden crewed flight! Originally seen as the favorite between the two companies selected for NASA’s Commercial Crew Program announced almost 10 years ago, Boeing finds itself in a much different position today. While many believed Boeing would handily beat its competitor, SpaceX, in reestablishing American domestic manned launch capabilities, the outcome was quite different. In fact, the race became so lopsided that SpaceX had already made its maiden manned flight more than 4 years ago and has since conducted seven official commercial crew flights. Meanwhile, doubts grew about whether Boeing would ever get this program off of the grounds.

But as everyone says, space is hard, and Boeing should still be applauded for crossing the finishing line. Since I wrote a post about SpaceX’s maiden manned commercial crew launch a little more than four years ago, it’s only fair I do one for Boeing as well. So, on the occasion of Starliner’s successful maiden manned flight, this post will provide a similar background primer on the Starliner program, covering its history and specifications along with my thoughts on the practical and policy significance of a fully operational Starliner program.

The Past: The Need for Commercial Crew

While the Space Shuttle was an inspiration for many, it was a program filled with cost overruns. Due to countless problems, the Space Shuttle never lived up to its original billing: launching up to 50 times a year. Marred by two deadly accidents, the program came to an early retirement on July 21, 2011 with the landing of Space Shuttle Atlantis.

The retirement of the Space Shuttle program left NASA without domestic manned launch capabilities. But, NASA was bounded by the International Space Station (“ISS”) Intergovernmental Agreement (Article 12) and several Memorandums of Understandings to transport its crew and that of its international partners to the ISS. Thus, NASA had to expand its partnership with Russia/Roscosmos (via the Soyuz space capsule) to ensure that it had a means of transporting crew members to and from the ISS. Purchasing these Soyuz rides involved navigating the political landscape as well with NASA having had to navigate through the restrictions that were set in place by the Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (“INKSNA”).

However, this reliance on a single foreign provider raised concerns about the security and stability of NASA's access to the ISS. So to address this issue, NASA established the Commercial Crew Program, aiming to create a commercially-developed domestic spacecraft capable of carrying astronauts to Outer Space. Under this private-public partnership, NASA would essentially outsource the development of the spacecraft to commercial enterprises with NASA acting mainly as the financier, selector, and eventual end-customer.

While the program initially included several commercial entities, after a few rounds, the field was ultimately culled down to two finalists: SpaceX and Boeing. While SpaceX bid low and only received $2.6 billion for the development of its Crew Dragon system, Boeing was awarded $4.2 billion for its Starliner system. Although Boeing wanted to be the sole recipient of the Commercial Crew funding, NASA likely thought that having two competitors in the race would help to reduce costs and provide extra domestic redundancy in case one of the vehicles malfunctions.

Now almost 10 years removed from that announcement, NASA’s decision appears downright prescient. Although Boeing was the early favorite, it lagged behind SpaceX and was nowhere near ready to deliver when SpaceX conducted its first maiden flight on May 30th 2020. But four years—and seven additional Crew Dragon flights—later from that SpaceX launch, Boeing has finally conducted a successful crewed launch of its Starliner spacecraft. Thus, it’s time for us to take a deeper dive into the specifications of the Boeing Starliner spacecraft.

The Present: Boeing Starliner Specifications

The Boeing Starliner spacecraft is a reusable capsule that can carry up to seven astronauts or a mix of crew and cargo to the ISS and other locations in low Earth orbit. The spacecraft’s official name is CST-100, with CST standing for “Crew Space Transportation”—likely a slight nod to the formal name of the Space Shuttle, the Space Transportation System. The number 100 represents the Karman Line at 100 kilometers above mean sea level, which is the most widely-accepted boundary for the start of Outer Space.

The Starliner spacecraft has a height of 16.5 feet (5 meter) and a diameter of 15 feet (4.6 meter) at its base. The manned version of the spacecraft can carry up to seven passengers, but NASA missions will typically require Starliner to carry either 4 or 5 passengers at a time, with the remaining space used for cargo. If NASA only sends 4 passengers, then Boeing can lease the remaining seat to a space tourist or a spaceflight participant from another country. For its first manned flight to the ISS, Starliner is expected to carry a total of 759 pounds (344 kilograms) of cargo that includes 452 pounds (205 kilograms) from Boeing and 307 pounds (139 kilograms) from NASA. This flight is anticipated to return with 750 pounds (340 kilograms) of cargo, with about 355 pounds (161 kilograms) coming from NASA.

While the Starliner spacecraft is anticipated to launch on top of a United Launch Alliance (ULA)’s Atlas V rocket for its ISS missions, the capsule is designed to be launch vehicle agnostic. When stacked on top of the Atlas V rocket, the total height of this launch system is 171 feet (52 meters).

The Starliner is made of two components: (1) a crew module and (2) a service module. While the crew module is designed to be reusable (envisioned to fly up to 10 missions with 6-months turnaround time), the service module will be expended for each mission. The two components will remain fully attached until the return mission-shortly before re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere.

The crew module uses 12 Reaction Control System (“RCS”) thrusters for propulsion, with each thruster capable of generating 100 pound-force. Meanwhile the service module has 28 RCS engines, with each generating 85 pound-force along with 20 Orbital Maneuvering and Attitude Control (OMAC) thrusters that can create 1,500 pound-force each. The Service Module also has four launch abort engines, each capable of generating 40,000 pound-force, which can separate the spacecraft from the rocket in the event of an emergency during launch.

The Starliner will also be equipped with more than 3,500 solar cells that can absorb energy from different spectrums of light, generating about 2.9 gigawatts of power. Located at the bottom of the service module, the solar cells will be protected from the harshness of Outer Space by a debris shield and can sustain the Starliner for 6 months while docked to the ISS.

For its flights to the ISS, it is anticipated that the Starliner’s total trip time from launch to docking will eventually be about 6 to 12 hours. However, it can take more than 24 hours if the Starliner is required to go on an orbital chase to the ISS. Most of the spacecraft operations are automated, including the docking processes, thanks to the inclusion of NASA’s Docking System. In the event that astronauts need to take over control, the Starliner’s control console has two display screens along with traditional switches and buttons for control (unlike the touchscreens used in SpaceX’s Crew Dragon capsule).

For landing, after the crew capsule is separated from the service module, its bottom heat shield will protect the capsule from temperatures that can reach up to 1650 degrees Celsius (3,000 degrees Fahrenheit). At approximately 9 kilometers (30,000 feet) above ground, two drag chutes are deployed to slow down the capsule. Then, three main parachutes are deployed, along with the inflation of airbags at 0.9 kilometers (3,000 feet) above ground. Starliner is expected to touch down on land rather than at sea, as saltwater can slow down the refurbishment process. The five possible landing sites are: (1) two in White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, (2) the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, (3) Wilcox Playa in Arizona, and (4) Edwards Air Force Base in California.

The Limbo: Development Issues

The Starliner program has been plagued by several challenges throughout its development. These issues have frequently delayed its progress, causing Boeing’s Starliner to lag far behind its competitor, SpaceX’s Crew Dragon. These troubles have also raised concerns about the spacecraft’s long-term viability. Some of the major setbacks include:

The 2016 Spacecraft Design Issues

The Starliner’s first significant delays were publicly disclosed in May 2016 and were related to the spacecraft’s interaction with its Atlas V launch vehicle. The integration of the capsule with the rocket caused mass and aeroacoustic issues. This then led Boeing to push back Starliner’s unmanned test flights to 2017 followed by a crewed flight in early 2018. Then in October 2016, Boeing announced further delays because of production and supplier issues with the Starliner itself. At the time, this meant that the first crewed flight would be ready until December 2018 at the earliest.

The 2018 Malfunctioning Valves

In June 2018, Boeing faced another setback when its Starliner experienced an anomaly during the launch abort engine hot fire test. This static test, conducted at NASA’s White Sands Test Facility in New Mexico, saw the launch-abort engines successfully start and perform as expected during the full duration of the test. However, during the shutdown process, malfunctioning valves prevented the propulsion system from fully shutting down, leading to a propellant leak. While the issues were eventually resolved, the pad abort test was initially pushed back to spring of 2019. But the necessary corrective actions caused further delays and the pad abort test did not take place until November 2019.

The 2019 Parachute Issue: When it came time to conduct the pad abort test in November 2019, Boeing’s streak of unluckiness continued. While the Starliner spacecraft was successfully pushed off of the test stand at White Sands Missile Range by its abort engines’ 180,000 pounds of generated thrust, the spacecraft encountered a problem when trying to safely return to ground. Only two of the three main parachutes successfully deployed. Boeing later attributed this fault to human error, caused by an unsecured connection between the pilot chute and the main chute (specifically a pin connecting the pilot chute to the main chute was not properly installed). While Boeing argued that the spacecraft could safely return to the ground with only two of the parachutes deployed, it was still a very visible blemish on a test that Boeing would have preferred to be picture perfect.

The 2019 Orbital Test Flight Software Issues

After years of delays, on December 20, 2019, Boeing finally conducted its inaugural launch of the Starliner spacecraft to Outer Space. While Boeing hoped for a successful launch, it looks like Starliner’s cruel fate was not done with it yet. This test flight encountered several significant issues, largely due to software issues. First, the spacecraft’s software grabbed the wrong time from the Atlas V launch rocket. The data used was 11 hours off from the real time, causing the spacecraft to burn too much fuel and preventing it from successfully rendezvousing and docking with the ISS. Second, some of the service module’s thrusters had a software mapping issue that could have caused a collision between the service module and the crew capsule after separation. By sheer luck, Boeing’s engineers discovered this error in time to make the proper modifications. It was later revealed that these software mistakes were not caught because Boeing never conducted a complete end-to-end test of the software. In a clear sign of frustration, NASA publicly called this mission a “high visibility close call.” Because of these issues and the failure of Boeing’s Starliner to reach the ISS, more delays ensued with Boeing having to absorb the cost ($410 million) of conducting another uncrewed test flight on its own expense.

2021 Second Orbital Flight Test Valve Issues

On August 3rd, 2021, after performing all of the required corrective measures, Boeing was ready to conduct its second uncrewed test flight to the ISS. But before the rocket can get off of the ground, another valve issue arose in Starliner’s propulsion systems . 13 of the 24 valves that regulate the flow of the oxidizer, dinitrogen tetroxide, through the service module were stuck in the off position. The problem was eventually diagnosed as corrosion in the valves caused by ambient humidity. Resolving this issue led to another 9-month delay, so it was May 2022 before Boeing finally completed its first successful uncrewed orbital test flight to the ISS. This further delay meant that Boeing had to absorb an extra $600 million loss on the development of its Starliner program.

2023 Crewed Test Flight Parachute and Flammable Tape Issues

Just when Boeing thought it was on the right track and ready for its first crewed test launch to the ISS in July 2023, more issues surfaced. In June 2023, two new major safety issues were uncovered. First, another parachute issue was discovered: the suspension lines of the main parachute had a lower failure load limit than previously expected. This meant that if one of the parachutes were to fail, the remaining parachute lines might not be able to sustain the capsule’s mass and could also snap. Thus, the Starliner would have failed a critical NASA’s safety requirement as all three parachutes must successfully deploy to achieve the necessary load limit. Second, a significant portion of the tape used to cover and wrap the wirings throughout the capsule was found to be flammable under certain circumstances. With this tape stretching to hundreds of feet within the Starliner, Boeing was facing down another significant delay as it needed to remove most of the tape and remediate the rest. These issues caused the first crew test to be pushed back to May 2024.

2024 Crewed Test Flight Valve, Helium Leak, and Computer Issues

As NASA astronauts suited up and strapped into their seats on the Starliner, positioned on the launch pad, it appeared that the spacecraft was finally ready to break free from its earthly shackles on a crewed test launch on May 6, 2024. However, fate had different plans. This time, a valve on the Atlas V rocket caused another delay as it kept fluttering. This led to the crew mission being scrubbed for another day. Eventually, it was determined that the valve had fluttered too many times and reached its safety limits, necessitating a replacement. But during this process, Boeing engineers also discovered a helium leak issue on the Starliner’s service module. While the helium leak will not pose a major safety issue, there were concerns about whether enough helium remained to force the propellants from storage to the thrusters. Fixing the helium leak could have delayed the crewed test flight by several months, but the analysis show that it was not a flight safety issue. As a result, Boeing and NASA jointly decided to categorize the issue as a “design vulnerability” and move forward to a June 1st launch date. However, on June 1st, another scrub occurred with less than four minutes (T-3:50) remaining when a launch pad-based computer did not activate in time, triggering an automatic abort. This setback prompted a final delay to the current launch date of June 5th, 2024.

The Progression: Starliner’s Hazy Road Ahead

With the development of the Starliner marred by numerous delays, some have called for the cancellation of the program in its entirety. Even from Boeing’s perspective, assuming a complete crewed test flight success, the future looks uncertain. To maintain the Starliner program, Boeing must focus on a key factor: its return on investment. However, for several reasons, this calculus currently does not favor Starliner’s continued existence.

With the company currently plagued by significant issues from its commercial airplanes division, Boeing might not be able to sustain the enormous costs associated with the Starliner program long-term. Starliner’s development involved significant investment in research and innovation, and while Boeing can protect such intellectual property rights via patents and trade secrets, the Starliner capsule needs a stable and predictable commercial stream of revenue to justify its continued operations. Without this solidified return on its investment, Boeing would likely view any further spending on the program as an unjustifiable sunk cost.

Additionally, Starliner’s performance during the test flights has significant implications for risk and liability. While NASA currently have oversight of the Starliner’s test missions, Boeing will eventually need to work with FAA to receive a license for Starliner’s operational flights. In order to receive such license, commercial space companies are required to carry insurance or demonstrate financial responsibility to cover potential damages. The FAA will determine the required insurance amounts based on the risks associated with the company’s launch activities. With the Starliner’s development history, filled with examples of software and equipment malfunctions, Boeing would likely face significant costs to insure its activities. This will further add to the cost of operations for the Starliner, further reducing its profitability margins even more.

Lastly, Boeing is dependent on several subcontractors for the success of the Starliner program. However, the development of this capsule has strained its relationships with some of its key subcontractors. While all parties would want to see the Starliner program flourish, as the “general contractor,” Boeing has greater stake in the program than its subcontractors. Even if there are exclusive licensing restrictions, these subcontractors could potentially use the similar types of components (along with similar intellectual property) they developed for other spacecrafts and rockets, making them less affected by any cancellation or delays in the Starliner Program. Without the right incentives, a subcontractor could very well walk away from the program, leaving Boeing to shoulder the cost and effort of finding a replacement vendor.

The Future: The Need for Starliner

Even with all the delays and uncertainties, assuming the Starliner is proven to be operationally feasible (so having a complete successful test flight from launch to landing), I believe there is an absolute need for the existence of this spacecraft. From a policy perspective, maintaining both the Boeing Starliner and SpaceX crew Dragon is crucial for America’s domestic human spaceflight program. Only through the existence of both can we maintain (a) proactive redundancy, (b) cost reduction, and (c) continuous innovation for America’s crewed space industry.

First, having redundancy is essential in the realm of Outer Space exploration, especially for crewed operations. If there is an issue with one spacecraft, having an alternative system at the ready ensures that NASA can continue its missions without significant interruptions and respond to emergencies. Having two fully functional spacecrafts serves as a guarantee that NASA will be able to fulfill its international obligations in transporting personnel to the ISS and its successor space station. By maintaining both the Starliner and Crew Dragon spacecrafts, NASA can mitigate the risk associated with dependency on a single supplier and create a more stable future for human spaceflight.

Second, having two suppliers will ensure that NASA can get the “best” deal. As different companies compete for lucrative NASA contracts, they are incentivized to reduce inefficiencies and streamline processes to offer a more competitive bid. As the end customer, NASA will be able to secure the best bid and the most cost-effective option for launching humans to Outer Space. The cost savings here benefit taxpayers and NASA’s other programs, as it allows for better resource allocation to other scientific missions. Furthermore, this competitive environment will not only benefit NASA but can also contribute to the overall growth and accessibility of Outer Space as both companies work to improve costs involved in the launch process.

Finally, competition will fuel further innovation as Boeing and SpaceX encourage each other to push the boundaries of what is possible in Outer Space transportation technologies. As they each vie for the “crown,” these space transportation companies will be incentivized to invest in research and development. This could unlock new advancements in spacecraft design, propulsion systems, and safety features. With competition fueling this constant pursuit for innovation, it will not only improve the capabilities of human space transportation systems but can also spill over into other areas of Outer Space exploration, benefiting future missions and scientific discoveries.

So, at the end of the long and tortuous road, Boeing looks like it’s almost across the finishing line (it still needs to get the crew safely home). While it has been an arduous journey filled with misfortunes and mistakes of its own making, I hope that the space division of Boeing will come out of this experience as a more modern space companies ready to tackle the challenges of this new space era. Even with all of its flaws in design and development, assuming that Starliner successfully completes all of its tests and become an operationally-capable crewed transport system, I believe that it is a system worth keeping to continue pursuing our Outer Space dreams.